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BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES:
A FRIEND OR FOE TO HUMAN RIGHTS?
MEGAN WELLS SHEFFER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The worst cases of corporate-related human rights harm have occurred,
predictably, in the places that need economic development the most: "in countries
that often had just emerged from or still were in conflict; and in countries where
the rule of law was weak and levels of corruption high."' Notably, corporations
"increasingly play a significant role in the civil wars of developing countries
from Sierra Leone, Angola, and the DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo] to
Azerbaijan and Myanmar." 2 For example, a United Nations Panel regarding the
ongoing DRC conflict found that corporations trading minerals in the DRC were
not only involved in the conflict but were "the engine of the conflict."
3
Sustainable economic development requires both foreign direct investment
(FDI) by multinational corporations (MNCs) and the protection of human rights.
FDI is a "category of international investment that reflects the objective of a
resident entity in one economy to obtain a lasting interest in an enterprise resident
in another economy."4  Human rights law, as described by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights - and the subsequent International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) - provides duties for States and affect a multitude of
human rights-related policy areas, such as labor law and environmental regulation.
Undoubtedly, FDI and MNCs "constitute powerful forces capable of generating
economic growth, reducing poverty, and increasing demand for the rule of law."5
* The author was a Chancellor's Scholar at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law. She
graduated in 2010 with a J.D. and certificate in International Law. Currently, she is a judicial law clerk
through the Attorney General's Honors Program, serving within the Executive Office for Immigration
Review. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of
Justice or the United States. This paper was the winning submission in the 2010 Leonard V. B. Sutton
international law writing competition. The author would like to thank Professor Ved Nanda, and the
Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, who made this publication possible.
1. Human Rights Council, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human
Rights, 16, U.N. Doc. A!HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2009) (prepared by John Ruggie) [hereinafter Ruggie -
Protect, Respect and Remedy].
2. Ole Kristian Fauchald & Jo Stigen, Transnational Corporate Responsibility for the 21st
Century: Corporate Responsibility Before International Institutions, 40 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv.
1025, 1045-46 (2009).
3. Id. at 1065.
4. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Glossary of Statistical Terms - Foreign Direct
Investment (Sept. 25, 2001), http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID= 1028.
5. Ruggie - Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note I, 2.
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Nevertheless, MNCs can also hinder economic development by violating, and
inhibiting the protection of, human rights.
In addition to actively perpetrating and enabling human rights violations,
MNCs can hinder a State's regulatory power to provide human rights protections.
The increasing power of MNCs is strengthened, at least in part, by Bilateral
Investment Treaties (BITs). A BIT is a treaty between two States that ensures that
investors of a State-Party receive certain standards of treatment when investing in
the territory of the other State-Party.6 The purpose of the BIT is to encourage FDI
between the two State-Parties, which hopefully leads to economic growth for both
State-Parties. However, BITs grant MNCs rights against States, and allow MNCs
to directly initiate arbitration against a State when the State has not fulfilled its
obligations under a BIT. The threat of a multi-million dollar adverse arbitration
decision pressures States to placate MNCs, and this limits a State's ability to
regulate, even in important human rights-related policy areas. For example, MNCs
have claimed millions of dollars in damages under BITs for State regulations
addressing an emergency financial crisis, refusing to grant a license for a toxic
waste facility, and enacting affirmative action legislation.
The field of corporate social responsibility is vast and deep, and has produced
a great deal of discussion and proposed solutions. However, this paper explores
the narrow subject of BITs. Currently, BITs empower MNCs and encumber a
State's regulatory power to promote and protect human rights. However, BITs can
be reformed to remove, or at least limit, these encumbrances. Moreover, BITs
could be restructured, not to remove the rights BITs grant to MNCs, but to create
reciprocal obligations for MNCs to act responsibly and not violate human rights.
Section I provides a brief history of the international investment law system and
the development of BITs. Section II defines the basic components of a BIT. Next,
Section III explains why the current patchwork BIT regime is insufficient. Finally,
Sections IV and V discuss proposed solutions to the inadequacies of the present
BIT regime.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
The regulation of international investment has deep roots in the development
of law regarding the treatment and legal status of foreigners over the past several
centuries. 8 Formal treaties governing international commerce, known as Treaties
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, flourished in the post-WWII era, and the
6. Jose E. Alvarez, Empire, Contemporary Foreign Investment Law: An "Empire of Law " or the
"Law of Empire "?, 60 ALA. L. REV. 943, 957-59 (2009).
7. Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI? Only a Bit. . and
They Could Bite 2, n.1 (World Bank Pol'y Res. Working Paper No. 3121. 2003), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id-636541 (citing CME Ltd. v. Czech Republic, an
award of $350 million; Loewen Group v. The United States, a claim for $450 million; and Methanex v.
The United States, a claim for $950 million).
8. ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUiS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 3-4
(2009).
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investment protection function of these treaties came to dominate and evolved into
BITs.9  During this period, there were a series of initiatives to establish a
multilateral legal framework for investment, including an International Trade
Organization (ITO), which failed, in part, due to existing preferences for BITs.
Consequently, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, negotiated in 1947,
did not include an investment framework.10
Since then, the international trade and investment law regimes have
developed separately. The Uruguay Round of negotiations, which established the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994, provided for centralized regulation of
international trade, but again excluded discussion of an investment framework.
While two WTO agreements touch on trade-related investment they do not
constitute comprehensive multilateral investment regulations: the Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures reaffirms that investment laws must be
consistent with WTO trade obligations, and the General Agreement on Trade in
Services creates rights for foreign investors to invest in certain service sectors. 1
Presently, international investment law exists through a fragmented
patchwork of BITs created to entice FDI. The frenetic rate of globalization has
increased the number of MNCs, and consequently, the frequency of FDI and the
use of BITs. During the 1970s there were more than 1,000 instances of States
nationalizing private investments, which made the compelling need to protect
foreign investors from unfair and arbitrary treatment by host governments more
apparent and led to a proliferation of BITs.' 2 Over the last two decades developing
nations have entered the international investment environment, providing fertile
new ground for investment opportunities and an exponential multiplication of
BITs.13 The rapid spread of BITs was likely the result of the increasing enthusiasm
for foreign investment in the developing world. BITs appeared to address a need
on the part of the developing countries "to add credibility to commitments these
countries made to investors."'' 4  Today, there are nearly 3,000 separate BITs
15
among more than 170 countries.
6
Recent attempts to restructure the patchwork BIT regime and create a
multilateral investment framework have been largely unsuccessful. Following the
9. Id. at 23-24.
10. Id. at 19-20.
11. Id. at 54-55.
12. Human Rights Council, Business and Human Rights: Further Steps Toward the
Operationalization of the "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, 22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/27
(Apr. 9, 2010) (prepared by John Ruggie) [hereinafter Ruggie - Further Steps].
13. Efraim Chalamish, The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De Facto Multilateral
Agreement?, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 303, 307-09 (2009).
14. Louis T. Wells, Protecting Foreign Investors in the Developing World. A Shift in US policy in
the 1990s?, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN THE 21 ST CENTURY 421,
444 (Robert Grosse ed., 2005).
15. Ruggie - Further Steps, supra note 12, 22.
16. Todd Weiler, Balancing Human Rights and Investor Protection: A New Approach for a
Different Legal Order, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 429, 430 (2004).
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failure of the Uruguay Round to obtain investment protection, the United States
promoted negotiations of a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) within
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) .
7
Activists argued against the agreement, concerned that it would constitute a
corporate bill of rights with no corresponding obligations. In February 1998, more
than 600 organizations from 67 countries released a joint statement calling for the
suspension of MAI negotiations. 18  This heightened public scrutiny further
discouraged interest by international businesses, which was already lacking. For
these reasons, in addition to disagreement between States on a broad range of
issues, MAI negotiations ended in April 1998 and have not resumed. 19
However, the failure of the MAI renewed enthusiasm for bringing investment
into the WTO regime. The 2001 Doha Declaration expressly recognized the need
for a multilateral investment framework.2 ° In 2003, at the Fifth Session of the
Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico, investment was at the center of the
debate between developed and developing countries, and was one of the proximate
causes for the breakdown of negotiations. 2 Developing nations wanted an
investment framework to include special considerations for developing countries,
including allowances for development policies and governments' rights to regulate
in the public interest. 22 Due to the divisive nature of this debate, the WTO
General Council has decided to exclude further discussion of multilateral
regulation of investment from the Doha Round of negotiations.23
Most recently, the European Union (EU), whose members are parties to over
1,200 BITs, has taken steps to solidify its members' investment policies.24 When
the Lisbon Treaty entered into force on December 1, 2009, the EU received
exclusive competence over FDI. This includes a transition of power to enter into
17. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 8, at 55.
18. National & International Opposition to the MAI, PUBLIC CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/
trade/issues/mai/Opposition/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
19. Press Release, Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Multilateral Agreement on Investment -
Report to Ministers, April 1998 (Apr. 28, 1998) (on file at http://www.oecd.org/
document/ 4/0,3746,en_2649_34529562_1933060 1_1 1_34529562,00.html).
20. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 20
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
21. AARON COSBEY, ET. AL., INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., INVESTMENT AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A GUIDE TO THE USE AND POTENTIAL OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS 25 (2004), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment investandsd.pdf.
22. Doha Declaration, supra note 20, 22.
23. Doha Work Programme, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004,
WT/L/579, 1(g) (Aug. 2, 2004), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dda-e/draft
_textgcdg_3 july04_e.htm.
24. Marc Maes, Reclaiming the Public Interest in Europe's International Investment Policy: Will
the Future EU BITs Be Any Better Than the 1200 Existing BITs of EU Member States, INVESTMENT
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BITs; the power EU members previously had to negotiate BITs with non-EU
States has shifted to the Union.25
On July 7, 2010 the European Commission released a draft Regulation and a
Communication. The draft Regulation, which proposes a transitional arrangement
for existing BITs, has to be approved by both the Council and the Parliament. 26 It
would give members temporary authority to maintain their existing BITs with non-
EU countries, and to even negotiate new BITs. However, the Commission would
be able to withdraw that authority if it concluded that a member's BIT
compromised the EU's investment policy. 27  The Communication is not very
detailed but it does mention broader policy objectives. It explicitly refers to the
objectives of the overall European foreign policy, including the promotion of the
rule of law, human rights, and sustainable development, and also to the OECD
Guidelines for Multinationals. 28 The Communication does not add any nuance or a
more balanced construction of typical BIT provisions, which are described in the
next section. Nevertheless, this is a unique opportunity for an assessment of the
existing BITs and for an open and broad discussion on the future European
international investment policy.
29
III. DESCRIPTION OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
A BIT is a treaty between two States. The BIT ensures that investors of a
State-Party receive certain standards of treatment when investing in the territory of
the other State-Party. 30 When there is a violation of a BIT, a victim investor can
directly bring a claim against the State that violated the BIT. Generally speaking,
there are five major actors on the international investment stage. First, a "Host-
State" is the State-Party in which an investment exists. Generally, because
developing States import more FDI, they are more often the Host-State. Second, a
"Home-State" is the State of corporate citizenship of the investing MNC.
Generally, because developed States export more FDI, they are more often the
Home-State. 3 1 Third, "Investors" are the MNCs that are corporate citizens of the
Home-State and that are making an investment in the Host-State. Fourth,
"impacted non-State actors" are those people groups that are affected by the
actions or demands of the investing MNCs. Fifth, "arbitration tribunals" serve as
the dispute resolution mechanisms for disputes arising under a BIT.
25. James Zhan, UNCTAD's 2010 World Investment Forum: High-level Experts Discuss
Investment Policies for Sustainable Development, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Dec. 2010, at 14,
available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/2010/i2/16/unctads-2010-world-investment-forum-high-level-
experts-discuss-investment-policies-for-sustainable-development/.
26. Maes, supra note 24, at 5.
27. Zhan, supra note 25, at 14.
28. Maes, supra note 24, at 5.
29. Id.
30. Alvarez, supra note 6, at 957-59.
31. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 8, at 3, n.6.
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BITs confer foreign investors rights, and while the specific language of BITs
vary, they tend to contain the following similar provisions.32 Most countries have
a Model BIT which serves as a template and is typically used as a starting point to
conduct negotiations of new BITs. The following provisions, taken from the
United States Model BIT, are examples of rights BITs commonly confer.
A National Treatment provision provides that foreign investors have the right
not to be treated less favorably than domestic investors in like circumstances:
Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors
with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management,
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its
territory.
33
A Most-Favored-Nation provision provides that foreign investors have the
right not to be treated less favorably than investors of any other country:
Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party [and investors'
investments] treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like
circumstances, to investors of any non-Party with respect to the
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation,
and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory.
34
A Fair and Equitable Treatment provision provides that foreign investors have
the right to a minimum standard of treatment:
Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance
with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment
and full protection and security.
(a) "fair and equitable treatment" includes the obligation not to deny
justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in
accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal
legal systems of the world; and
(b) "full protection and security'" requires each Party to provide the level
of police protection required under customary international law.
35
Expropriation provisions ensure that foreign investors have the right to be
compensated for expropriations:
32. Alvarez, supra note 6, at 957-59.
33. 2004 Model BIT, Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment art.
3 (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/l17601.pdf [hereinafter U.S.
Model BIT].
34. Id. art. 4.
35. Id. art. 5.
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Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment
either directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to
expropriation or nationalization ("expropriation"), except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) in a non-discriminatory manner;
(c) on payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation; and
(d) in accordance with due process of law and [the Minimum Standard
of Treatment]
36
Lastly, most BITs have a dispute resolution clause that constitutes "a
unilateral offer to settle disputes by arbitration, extended to the investor by the
state, and which the investor accepts by initiating arbitration under the treaty.",
3 7
Where a Host-State has a BIT with a foreign investor's Home-State and the Host-
State breaches its obligations to the investor enumerated in the BIT, the investor
may bypass domestic court systems and bring a claim directly against the Host-
State before an international arbitration tribunal. 38  Thus, the arbitration is not
between the two States that entered into the BIT, but rather, BITs allow MNCs to
directly sue nation-States for violating their treaty obligations to the corporate
investor. Notably, investors have initiated the vast majority of cases. The few
instances where Host-States have raised claims against foreign investors have not
been based on a BIT, but rather based on the contractual relationship between the
Host-State and the investor.39
There are a variety of arbitration institutions that are used to resolve disputes
arising under BITs. The leading international arbitration institution devoted to
investor-State dispute settlement is the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID). ICSID is an autonomous international institution
established under a multilateral treaty, the Convention on Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, which has over 140
member States. ICSID does not arbitrate disputes directly, but rather it provides
the institutional and procedural framework for independent arbitral tribunals to
resolve the dispute.4 0 Another example of an international arbitration institution is
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).
4 1
36. Id. art. 6.
37. Noemi Gal-Or, The Investor and Civil Society as Twin Global Citizens: Proposing a New
Interpretation in the Legitimacy Debate, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 271, 281 (2009).
38. Id. at 281-82.
39. Fauchald & Stigen, supra note 2, n.118 (citing Tanzania Elec. Supply Co. v. Ind. Power
Tanzania Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/98/8 (2001); Genin v. Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No.
ARB/99/2 (2001); SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/6 (2004)).
40. About ICSID, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&pageN
ame=AboutICSIDHome (last visited Mar. 1,2011).
41. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, About UNCITRAL,
http: /www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/aboutus.htm (last visited Mar. 1,2011).
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Regardless of which arbitral rules are used, the decisions of the arbitrators are only
binding on the parties to the arbitration and do not create binding precedent.
Awards from BIT arbitration tribunals are limited to financial compensation and
"normally eminently enforceable. 42
The enforceability of BIT arbitration awards is a function of two factors.
First, a Host-State's non-compliance with an adverse award may deter future
investments because investors will see the Host-State as inhospitable and a higher-
risk investment environment. Second, where a MNC receives a favorable decision
in a BIT arbitration and the Host-State does not comply with the arbitration award,
the Host-State can expect diplomatic pressure from the Home-State to pay the
MNC the compensation awarded by the arbitration tribunal.
For example, CalEnergy, a U.S. corporation, had two geothermal projects in
Indonesia that became the subject of an arbitration and an award was issued in
favor of CalEnergy. However, Indonesia refused to pay. CalEnergy had political
risk insurance with the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), 43 an
agency of the United States government. 4  OPIC then had authority to seek
payment from Indonesia under the arbitration award. In July 2000, the U.S.
ambassador to Indonesia, Robert Gelbard, stated that he was "running out of
patience" with Indonesia's tardy payment to OPIC. He threatened to cut off aid to
Indonesia and declare expropriation: "There is always the possibility of declaring
expropriation . If we were to do this, it would result in a dramatic deterioration
of the rupiah and would hurt Indonesia very much. 45  OPIC also removed
Indonesia from the list of countries eligible for political risk insurance. The
strategy worked. OPIC and Indonesia reached a settlement in mid-200 1.46
Investor-State disputes are increasing faster than other areas of public
international law dispute settlement. These investor-State dispute resolution
mechanisms were largely unknown until recently.47 The first modem investor-
State arbitration was decided in 1990.48 After the passage of the 1994 North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which under Chapter 11 provides
many of the same investors' rights provided in BITs, investors began to
42. Weiler, supra note 16, at 430-3 1.
43. Wells, supra note 14, at 452.
44. Press Release, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Spinelli Addresses Sustainable
Development at London Conference (June 17, 2009), available at http://www.opic.gov/news/press-
releases/2009/pr061709 [hereinafter OPIC-Spinelli].
45. Wells, supra note 14, at 452.
46. Jennifer M. DeLeonardo, Are Public and Private Political Risk Insurance Two of a Kind?
Suggestions for a New Direction for Government Coverage, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 737, 770 (2005).
47. Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., European Parliament Hearing on Foreign Direct Investment,
at 7 (Nov. 9, 2010) (presented by Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201011/20101118ATT96250/20101118ATT96
250EN.pdf.
48. Id. at 3.
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increasingly use investor-State arbitration as way of settling disputes.49 The exact
number of investor-State arbitration cases are unknown because the initiation of
the arbitrations and their results are not always released publicly. Given that there
have been over 350 known cases, commentators estimate that the total is well over
400. On average, at least 30 to 40 more investor-State cases occur every year.
50
To summarize, BITs give foreign investors highly enforceable rights against
the Host-State, but provisions setting out investor obligations "are virtually
nonexistent., 51 However, given that BITs are widely used and that the investment
arbitration tribunals are very effective, BITs may be a promising choice to serve as
a mechanism for the promotion of corporate social responsibility and the
protection of human rights.
IV. GAPS IN THE PATCHWORK REGIME OF BITS
The patchwork of BITs that comprise the international investment system has
resulted in a diverse and varied legal system, which suffers from several flaws.
BIT investor-State arbitration tribunals pose challenges that are unique and not
present in more traditional commercial arbitrations, which typically involve two
private parties contesting commercial matters and do not include State
governments.52
A. The Origin of BITs Has Created an Asymmetry in Power and Experience
One problem posed by BITs comes from the historical development of the
patchwork BIT regime. BITs have been designed to facilitate and promote global
commerce, and because international investment law is rooted in early notions of
the protection of foreigners, BITs can be seen as primarily safeguarding the
interests of private investors. 53 Essentially, BITs secure an exchange: the State
agrees to certain protection obligations in exchange for a foreigner's commitment
to invest.
54
Given that the origins of BITs are in the former colonial powers with
presently the largest economies, it should be recognized that "[e]xisting
international investment agreements are based on a 50-year-old model that remains
focused on the interests of investors from developed countries., 55 According to a
2007 study of concluded and pending ICSID cases, the majority of cases have been
filed against developing countries: 74 percent against middle-income developing
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Fauchald & Stigen, supra note 2, at 1054.
52. See, e.g., Luke Eric Peterson, Pakistan Attorney General Advises States to Scrutinize
Investment Treaties Carefully, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Dec. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Peterson -
Pakistan].
53. Weiler, supra note 16, at 430-31.
54. Id. at 431.
55. S. Aft., Dept. of Trade & Indus., Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework Review:
Government Position Paper, at 11 (June 2009), available at http://www.pmg.org.za/files/docs/
090626trade-bi-lateralpolicy.pdf [hereinafter S. Aft. BIT Review].
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countries; 19 percent against low-income developing countries; and only 1.4
percent against G8 countries. Additionally, most cases have concluded in favor of
the investors: 36 percent were decided in favor of investors and 34 percent were
56settled out of court with compensation to the investor.
This asymmetry of power and experience has resulted in developing States
negotiating BITs without fully appreciating the risks involved and entering into
57agreements that have heavily favored foreign investors. Some scholars express
that this will lead, or already has led, to a "race to the bottom," whereby
developing nations loosen investment regulations in competition to attract FDI,
constraining their regulatory power to pursue legitimate public interest objectives,
and resulting in more human rights abuses.
58
Currently, South Africa, like a growing number of developing States, is
reviewing its BIT commitments "as an exercise to do damage control. '59 In
reviewing the travaux prparatoires of its current BITs, the South African
Department of Trade and Industry realized that the inexperience of its negotiators
and their lack of knowledge of investment law have resulted in investment
agreements that are not in the interests of South Africa.
60
Similarly, Pakistan has, until recently, treated BITs as "photo-op" agreements,
which were signed hastily with little consideration of the legal consequences. In
2006, Pakistan's Attorney General described this former approach as follows:
"Because someone is going visiting someplace and wants to sign an 'unimportant'
document; or someone is coming over for a visit and an 'unimportant' document
has to be signed. And a BIT . . until very recently was regarded as one such
(unimportant) document." Pakistani officials estimate that dozens of BITs were
concluded in this manner, with the consequences only becoming clear after foreign
investors began invoking BITs and initiating investor-State arbitrations against
Pakistan. In 2001, the first arbitration, filed by a Swiss MNC, Soci6t6 G~n~rale de
Surveillance S.A. (SGS), took Pakistan's government by surprise: "SGS having
lost before the Swiss Supreme Court, having lost in Pakistan, how could it start a
third round?" Pakistan's Attorney General commented that "[i]n many ways, the
foreign investor is seeking an international arbitral review of sorts of government
56. SARAH ANDERSON & SARA GRUSKY, INST. FOR POL'Y STUDIES & FOOD AND WATER WATCH,
CHALLENGING CORPORATE INVESTOR RULE: HOW THE WORLD BANK'S INVESTMENT COURT, FREE
TRADE AGREEMENTS, AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES HAVE UNLEASHED A NEW ERA OF
CORPORATE POWER AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT, ix (2007), available at http://www.ips-
dc.org/reports/challengingcorporateinvestorrule.
57. See, e.g., S. Afr. BIT Review, supra note 55, at 5.
58. Ruggie - Further Steps, supra note 12; Ruggie - Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note 1,
14; Chalamish, supra note 13, at 317; Weiler, supra note 16, at 433.
59. S. Aft. BIT Review, supra note 55, at 55.
60. Id. at 5.
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conduct on important public policy issues issues which, until recently, were
immune from any non-domestic scrutiny.,
61
As these examples show, the patchwork BIT regime has developed in an ad
hoc manner and developing countries are put at a disadvantage for two reasons.
First, as developing nations entered the global economy they lacked the experience
developed States possessed with decades of FDI, treaty negotiation, and
knowledge of BITs. Second, developing nations are induced to sign BITs because
they want to attract FDI for economic development. Thus, developing nations are
more often Host-States rather than Home-States, and consequently, more often the
defendant in BIT arbitration claims. Conversely, the plaintiff MNCs tend to be
from larger, more powerful, developed States.
B. The Separation of Human Rights and Investment Law in Policymaking
Another problem with the current patchwork BIT regime is that, thus far,
international investment law and human rights have existed in separate spheres.
Generally, human rights norms are absent in the development of domestic
investment policies and in the formation of BITs. A State's "duty to protect
against non-State abuses [including those perpetrated by MNCs] is part of the very
foundation of the international human rights regime., 62 However, governments
often keep human rights policy within its own conceptual and typically weak
institutional box, segregated from the development of other policies regarding
investment and corporate governance.63 This "horizontal incoherence" often
results in circumstances where "departments and agencies which directly shape
business practices - including corporate law and securities regulation, investment,
export credit and insurance, and trade - typically work in isolation from, and
uninformed by, their Government's own human rights obligations and agencies.
64
The fact that BITs are generally devoid of any mention of human rights
65
exemplifies the "horizontal incoherence" of government policymaking.
C. Lack of Jurisdiction to Address Human Rights-Related Issues in BIT
Arbitration Tribunals
In investment arbitration, disputes arising under BITs are generally treated as
solely commercial disputes.66  Human rights and broader public interest
61. Peterson -Pakistan, supra note 52.
62. Human Rights Council, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of
Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, 18, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/035 (Feb. 19, 2007)
(prepared by John Ruggie).
63. Ruggie - Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note 1, 22.
64. Ruggie - Further Steps, supra note 12, 18; Ruggie - Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra
note 1, 33.
65. Recently, States have considered adding human rights protections to their model BITs and this
will be discussed later in this article.
66. Ruggie -Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note 1, 37.
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considerations typically have little if any role.67 Moreover, the jurisdiction of the
tribunal to address human rights violations will depend on the specific language of
the underlying BIT.68
For example, consider the investment arbitration tribunal's decision in
Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Ghana. Mr. Biloune, a foreign
investor, sought recovery alleging that the Government of Ghana's detention and
expulsion of him and violations of his property and contractual rights constituted
an actionable human rights violation under an applicable BIT. The arbitration
tribunal concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over human rights violations because
the underlying BIT only obligated the parties to arbitrate disputes regarding
foreign investment and Mr. Biloune's allegations were independent of the
investment violation claim.69
Additionally, when arbitral panels have referenced human rights issues in BIT
arbitration awards, it is in relation to only the investors' rights (e.g. - rights to
property, due process, etc.) and not the rights of Host-State's citizens. In 2008,
arbitrators awarded moral damages to a company whose executives were
intimidated by the Host-State's agents and armed individuals, and subsequently
suffered the "stress and anxiety of being harassed, threatened and detained.,
71
D. Lack of Transparency and Public Participation in BIT Arbitration
Tribunals
Further problems stem from the fact that BIT disputes are often resolved in
secret. Preferences for commercial confidentiality often prohibit public knowledge
of, or involvement in, the arbitration process.71
ICSID offers the greatest level of transparency.7 2 All ICSID pending and
concluded cases are available to the public, including the subject matter of the
arbitration, party names, date of registration, composition of the tribunal, and the
procedural timeline.73 However, actual ICSID arbitration tribunals cannot be
described as completely open.74 Information on the parties' arguments, the
67. Id.
68. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 8, at 107-09.
69. Id.
70. LUKE ERIC PETERSON, RIGHTS & DEMOCRACY, INT'L CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEMOCRATIC DEV., HUMAN RIGHTS AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: MAPPING THE ROLE OF
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW WITHIN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 44 (2009), available at http://www.dd-
rd.ca/site/_PDF/publications/globalization/HIRA-volume3-ENG.pdf [hereinafter PETERSON -
MAPPING].
71. Ruggie - Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note 1, 37.
72. PETERSON - MAPPING, supra note 70, at 41-42.
73. MARC JACOB, INST. FOR DEV. & PEACE, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 24 (2010), available at http://www.humanrights-business.org/files/intemational
-investment-agreements and humanrights.pdf.
74. PETERSON - MAPPING, supra note 70, at 41-42; Ignacio Torterola, The Transparency
Requirement in the New UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: A Premonitory View, INVESTMENT TREATY
NEWS, Sept. 23, 2010, at 10.
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minutes and other records of the proceeding are not available, and the parties may
agree to keep the contents of the final award confidential.75  Moreover, all
proceedings are closed to the public unless both parties agree otherwise, and in the
past many ICSID stakeholders have objected to measures for greater
transparency.76
Additionally, there are many other investment tribunals that offer much less
transparency. For example, the UNCITRAL rules require that awards not be
published unless both parties consent.77 Consequently, an unknown number of
BIT arbitration cases have been completed without any public disclosure or any
ability of interested observers to monitor and analyze developments in the
78investment law regime.
Investment tribunals do often consult and cite other investment arbitration
decisions. While BITs differ, many employ very similar language, as described
above in Section II. For example, many BITs have similar language referring to
"fair and equitable treatment." Looking at how other tribunals have interpreted
this broad language is helpful. However, the lack of published decisions and the
secrecy of BIT disputes make it difficult to know what areas of investment law are
consistent and established and what areas are still emerging or ambiguous7 9
E. Arbitrators' Lack of Human Rights Expertise and Opposing Allegiances in
BIT Arbitration Tribunals
The arbitrators that resolve BIT disputes can also present a problem for the
promotion and protection of human rights. Generally, in investor-State arbitration
tribunals, the parties choose the arbitrators. Each party has the right to appoint one
arbitrator and the third arbitrator is chosen through agreement of the two party-
nominated arbitrators, and ideally, the parties as well.8 °
However, arbitrators present two distinct problems. First, human rights
norms may be outside the scope of the arbitrator's expertise. 81 There are no
significant restrictions on who can serve as arbitrators. ICSID requires that
arbitrators must have "recognized competence in the fields of law, commerce,
industry or finance. 82 Most BIT arbitrators have commercial backgrounds and are
75. JACOB, supra note 73.
76. PETERSON- MAPPING, supra note 70, at 41-42.
77. JACOB, supra note 73.
78. LUKE ERIC PETERSON & KEVIN R. GRAY, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV.,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND IN INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION 34-35 (2005), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf'2003/investment int humanfights
_bits.pdf, PETERSON - MAPPING, supra note 70, at 44.
79. Torterola, supra note 74, at 10-11.
80. Tony Cole, Arbitrator Appointments in Investment Arbitration. Why Expressed Views on
Points of Law Should be Challengeable, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Sept. 23, 2010, at 14, available at
http://www.iisd.org/itn/2010/09/23/arbitrator-appointments-in-investment-arbitration-why-expressed-
views- on-points-of-law-should-be-challengeable-2/.
81. Chalamish, supra note 13, at 352-53.
82. Cole, supra note 80.
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not familiar with matters pertaining to human rights-related laws. Thus, even if a
tribunal found it appropriate to address a human rights-related matter, the
arbitrators may not be fully versed in how to proceed. Conversely, many human
rights experts would similarly lack the necessary expertise in international
investment law to serve as an arbitrator in a BIT arbitration.83
Secondly, the world of international investment arbitrators is a relatively
small, close community. Understandably, these specialized arbitrators are
concerned with "the securing of their next appointment to a tribunal" and
consequently, their actions must ensure that MNCs will want them to serve as
arbitrators in the future. In this small community, to obtain future employment,
arbitrators must make a "display of commercial probity and their loyalty to the
values of multinational business." Moreover, arbitrators often also serve as
counsel to parties in other international investment related cases."
F. BITs Can Limit State Sovereignty
One of the most-discussed problems posed by BITs is their capability to limit
State regulatory power. When a State creates a law or policy in an area that affects
an MNC, and there are many policy areas that can affect a foreign MNC's
investment, the State runs the risk that the MNC may bring a multi-million dollar
claim against the State for violating a BIT. The majority of investment cases
involve economic sectors and policy areas that governments often regulate because
these areas are of critical importance to any society. According to a 2007 study of
concluded and pending ICSID cases, the majority of cases involved either basic
public services or energy resources: 42 percent involved water, electricity,
telecoms, and waste management, and 29 percent involved oil, gas, and mining.
Additionally, MNCs have won systematic victories regarding State regulation
that could be characterized as responding to social and economic emergencies.
The Argentine financial crisis of the early 2000s produced such emergencies, yet
the resulting investor-State arbitration cases upheld investment contracts despite
the fact that they were arguably economically and socially impossible due to the
financial crisis. In the absence of express BIT provisions regarding human rights,
arbitrators struggled with Argentina's human rights defense arguments.
86
Generally, international arbitration tribunals have held that States must
comply with both international investment law and domestic human rights
obligations8 7 The following are four ways in which the current patchwork BIT
regime can limit State sovereignty.
83. JACOB, supra note 73, at 25.
84. Id. at 25-26.
85. ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 56.
86. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 8, at 75.
87. Id.
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1. Host-State Agreements and Risk-Stabilization Clauses
In addition to BITs, Host-States enter into agreements with individual
investors. Host-State agreements often include "risk stabilization clauses." These
clauses can serve to insulate investors from having to implement human rights-
related laws (e.g. - laws related to labor rights, environmental regulation, etc.) or
may require Host-States to compensate investors for the costs of compliance.8"
Additionally, risk stabilization clauses can include promises to "freeze" the
existing regulatory regime for the duration of the investment, which can be as long
as fifty years if it is a major infrastructure or extractive industries project.
89
Where a Host-State attempts to force an investor to comply with new
legislation despite a risk stabilization clause, even where the legislation applies to
all businesses uniformly, this action can be seen as violating the BIT between the
Host-State and the investor's Home-State. Specifically, such an action would
violate a BIT's assurances of "fair and equitable" treatment and "umbrella
clauses," which require States to abide by contractual obligations with investors. 90
BIT disputes arising from these circumstances have involved staggering claims and
awards for compensation, reaching to hundreds of millions of dollars.91
Studies have shown that this regulatory imbalance is particularly problematic
for developing countries. Agreements between investor-MNCs and non-members
of the OECD constrain Host-States' regulatory power significantly more than
agreements with the thirty members of the OECD. 92 A study of 90 Host-State
agreements showed that none of the Host-State agreements with OECD countries
offered investors exemptions from new laws and they generally tailored risk
93stabilization clauses to preserve public interest considerations. Conversely, a
majority of the Host-State agreements between investing MNCs and non-OECD
countries contained provisions that insulated investors from compliance with new
environmental and social laws or mandated compensation from the Host-State for
compliance. Host-State agreements between investor-MNCs and Sub-Saharan
African nations had the most sweeping risk stabilization provisions.94
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. ANDREA SHEMBERG, INT'L FIN. CORP. & OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, STABILIZATION CLAUSES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 138 (2008), available at
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/p StabilizationClausesandHumanRightsiSFIL
E/Stabilization+Paper.pdf; Ruggie - Protect, Respect andRemedy, supra note 1, 12.
91. Hallward-Driemeier, supra note 7, at 2, n. 1.
92. Ruggie -Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note 1, 34-36. OECD members: Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark. Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain. Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States.
93. Human Rights Council, Business & Human Rights: Towards Operationalizing the "Protect,
Respect and Remedy" Framework, 32, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/I 1/13 (Apr. 22, 2009) (prepared by John
Ruggie) [hereinafter Ruggie - Towards].
94. Id. 32.
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2. Host-State Regulatory Power and Indirect Expropriation
Investor-MNCs have challenged Host-State regulations by alleging that they
violate BIT protections against expropriation. As discussed above, BITs generally
prohibit government expropriation of an investor's investment unless the
expropriation is for a non-discriminatory public purpose and the investor is
compensated. An expropriation may be direct or indirect. Defining an indirect
expropriation requires an "effects based approach" whereby "the focus of the
analysis is the effect of the State measure on the investment." 95 A wide variety of
government measures have been found to constitute an indirect expropriation:
exorbitant or arbitrary taxation; measures substantially interfering with the
management or control of a business enterprise; annulment and cancellation of
property rights, contractual rights, debts, or licenses; the harassment of employees,
blocking of access to a plant, and government take-over of a key supplier; and
96other arbitrary conduct depriving the investor of the benefits of its property.
A recently decided BIT case further illustrates the problem. 97 In November
2006, European investors registered a claim with ICSID against South Africa,
contending that the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA)
violated the Italy-South Africa BIT and BITs concluded by South Africa with
Belgium and Luxembourg.98 The investors involved hold large investments in the
natural stone business in South Africa, controlling about 80 percent of South
Africa's stone exports. 99 The MPRDA vests all mineral and petroleum rights with
the South African government and requires that businesses apply for a right to
convert their former holdings into "new-order" rights, which are held and used
under license from the South African government. In this conversion process,
South Africa's Department of Mining and Energy considers the Constitution's
overall goal of redressing historical, social, and economic inequalities. °° The
investors claimed that the MPRDA extinguished their ownership of mineral rights
in South Africa, which constituted an indirect expropriation. The claimants also
alleged that they have been denied fair and equitable treatment because of
affirmative action requirements for the hiring of black or historically
disadvantaged managers and the selling of 26 percent of their shareholdings to
black or historically disadvantaged individuals.101
95. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 8, at 326.
96. Id. at 327-28.
97. Ruggie - Further Steps, supra note 12, 21 (citing Piero Foresti v. Republic of S. Afr., ICSID
Case No. ARB/07/1, Award (Aug. 4,2010)).
98. Luke Eric Peterson, European Mining Investors Mount Arbitration Over South African Black
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Ultimately, this case was settled outside of the arbitration tribunal. Following
an agreement between the parties whereby South Africa granted the investors new
mining rights, the investors requested to discontinue the arbitration proceedings.
In August 2010, the tribunal then dismissed the investors' claims and ordered the
investors to pay EUR400,000 to South Africa for arbitration costs. 0 2 While this
case could have ended with much weightier consequences for South Africa, it
exemplifies how the current BIT regime provides MNCs with a cause of action and
a forum to directly challenge a nation-State's domestic policies. The stakes for
developing nations are enormous.
Similarly, there have been several disputes regarding Host-State measures
affecting the privatization of water supplies, which pit investors' rights against the
increasingly recognized right to water.'0 3 In Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v.
United Republic of Tanzania, the investors, a British-German consortium, won a
bid to upgrade and manage water and sanitation infrastructure in Tanzania, but
underestimated the difficulty of the project and sought to renegotiate the contract.
Tanzania refused to renegotiate, repudiated the contract, and seized control of the
project. The investors initiated a claim with ICSID requesting $20 million in
compensation for the alleged expropriation of their investment in the water project.
The arbitration tribunal held that Tanzania violated the expropriation clause of the
United Kingdom-Tanzania BIT.10 4  Tanzania, and several amici curaie
submissions, argued that Tanzania's actions were justified on human rights
grounds. Nevertheless, the tribunal refused to defer to human rights laws for
clarification because the expropriation provisions were clear and Tanzania's
repudiation of the contract was inconsistent with the contract's termination
clause. 10 5 However, the tribunal awarded no compensation given that, due to the
investor's poor planning and implementation, the monetary loss was inevitable.1
0 6
3. Police Powers and Indirect Expropriation
Not all governmental deprivations of property constitute an expropriation.
International law authorities have regularly recognized three broad categories of
"police power" regulation that might justify non-compensation where there is a
deprivation: (1) public order and morality; (2) protection of human health and
environment; and (3) State taxation. v07 However, particularly with public morality
regulations and policies to protect human health and environment, there is a lack of
precise definitions and guidance.l°8
102. Piero Foresti v. Republic ofS. Afr., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/1, Award, 133 (Aug. 4,2010).
103. JACOB, supra note 73, at 14.
104. Id.
105. Jorge Daniel Taillant & Jonathan Bonnitcha, International Investment Law and Human Rights,
in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 57, 75-76 (Marie-Claire Cordonier
Segger et al. eds., 2011).
106. JACOB, supra note 73, at 14.
107. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 8, at 358.
108. Id. at 360-61.
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Moreover, perspectives differ regarding the effect of police powers. One
perspective is that the "police powers" are a criterion which is weighed in the
balance with other factors. Others argue that "police powers" are a controlling
element that exempts automatically the measure from any duty for
compensation.1 9 In practice, BIT tribunal's put the burden of proof on the State,
forcing the police power justification to become a defense." 0
"A significant consideration in assessing police power regulations . is the
proportionality between the harm that the government measure aims to address and
its effect on the investor, in light of the investor's legitimate investment-backed
expectations."' This was the issue in the ICSID case of Thcnicas
Medioambientales Tecned S.A. v. The United Mexican States (Tecmed). 12  In
Tecmed, the investor alleged that the Mexican government's failure to re-license its
hazardous waste site violated the Spain-Mexico BIT and constituted an indirect
expropriation. 13 The waste site had been plagued by "sit-ins by local residents
protesting the site's technical viability and lack of public participation in decisions
regarding the hazardous waste confinement and [facility's] proximity to [nearby
communities]., 4 Notably, civil society groups had alleged that the waste facility
had "lacked the proper environmental impact authorization, and had illegally
deposited hazardous waste from another company prior to the closing of the waste
site in 1999." Consequently, the NAFTA Commission for Environmental
Cooperation held that a fact-finding inquiry was warranted but this was deferred
due to the ongoing ICSID arbitration."15 The investor argued that its waste facility
"was the target of organized protests designed to achieve a protectionist end:
protecting Mexico's only other hazardous waste storage facility in Mina, near
Monterrey.""16
The Tribunal attempted to determine whether the Mexican government's
measures had "a reasonable relationship of proportionality"''17 "with respect to
their goals, the deprivation of economic rights and the legitimate expectations of
[the investor]." ' 18 This standard appears to lie somewhere in vast expanse between
109. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], "Indirect
Expropriation" and the "Right to Regulate" in International Investment Law 18 (Working Papers on
International Investment No. 2004/4, Sept. 2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/22/54/33776546.pdf.
110. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL,supra note 8, at 366.
111. Id at 363.
112. OECD, supra note 109, at 18 (discussing Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A, v. The
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003)).
113. Id.
114. Luke Eric Peterson, Mexico 's Treatment of Hazardous Waste Site Violates Mexico-Spain BIT,
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the requirement that there be a plausible basis for the measure and the requirement
that the measure be the least restrictive means necessary to meet the government's
objectives. 119 The Tribunal noted:
Even before the Claimant made its investment, it was widely known that
the investor expected its investments in the Landfill to last for a long
term and that it took this into account to estimate the time and business
required to recover such investment and obtain the expected return upon
making its tender offer for the acquisition of the assets related to the
Landfill.12
0
Based on these considerations of the investor's legitimate expectations and a
finding that the government's actions were disproportionate to the investor's
"infringements," the Tribunal found against Mexico and awarded the investor $5
million.1
2 1
4. Lack of Guidance Regarding How Tribunals Should Balance
Investors' Rights Against States' Obligations and Sovereignty
Many BIT disputes pit an investor's rights against a Host-State's obligations
under domestic and international law, and BITs give tribunal arbitrators little to no
guidance on how these conflicts should be reconciled. At some point a Host-
State's obligations must outweigh an investor's rights under BITs, but where this
line is drawn remains unclear. States have achieved some limited success in
arguing that international human rights law should be used as an interpretative aid
to guide vague treaty and contract standards.
22
An example of a successful attempt to invoke human rights obligations would
be the case discussed above in Section III(F)(2), Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v.
United Republic of Tanzania. While the investors won their expropriation claim,
the tribunal rejected their fair and equitable treatment claim based on Tanzania's
human rights obligations. The tribunal found that the investors' legitimate
expectations were partly determined by the "particular investment environment."
Here, the environment had two important characteristics: (1) Tanzania was a
developing State; and (2) Tanzania was bound by international human rights
obligations to protect its citizens' right to water.
123
Conversely, an example of a failed attempted to invoke human rights
obligations would be the case of Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona
S.A., and Vivendi Universal v. Argentina.124 This claim concerned a 1993 water
privatization program and a 30-year concession granted by the Argentine
119. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 8, at 365.
120. OECD, supra note 109, at 20.
121. Id; Peterson, supra note 114.
122. Taillant & Bonnitcha, supra note 105, at 75.
123. Id. at 75-76.
124. Lise Johnson, Argentina on the Hook for Breach of Fair and Equitable Treatment,
INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Sept. 23, 2010, at 23, available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/
2010/09/23/awards-and-decisions/.
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government to a company created by the claimants to operate water and waste-
water services for Buenos Aires. In April 2003, the investor-MNCs initiated an
ICSID arbitration against Argentina. They alleged that government actions and
omissions related to the Argentine financial crisis stymied the concession and
destroyed the value of the investment, in violation of Argentina's BITs with Spain,
the United Kingdom, and France. During the arbitration, the tribunal addressed
this claim under the BIT's fair and equitable treatment provisions. The tribunal
interpreted the provision to require that Host-States must protect investors'
objective and reasonable "legitimate expectations" by taking into account all
relevant circumstances, including the nature of the investment, Argentina's rights
and interests to exercise its regulatory authority, and Argentina's historical,
political, economic, and social conditions. 125  Argentina, and NGOs, through
amicus curiae briefs, argued that a government's human rights obligations to
assure its population the right to water should trump its obligations to investors
under BITs. In July 2010, the Tribunal rejected this, holding that a State must
respect both its human rights and treaty obligations equally, and found Argentina
liable for violating the applicable BITs.
1 26
Thus, the fact that the current, nebulous BIT regime allows MNCs to punish a
State's regulatory actions regarding important policy areas, such as public services
or the energy sector, is particularly problematic. Notably, even where such
disputes are decided with minimal financial awards to investors, the mere potential
of an adverse arbitration decision with great financial and political costs "might
suffice to cause 'chilling effect' on national regulation.
1 27
V. How To PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS WITHIN THE PRESENT BIT REGIME
The future possibility of a multilateral investment framework is bleak.
Nevertheless, given the increasing and widespread use of BITs worldwide and the
effectiveness of BIT dispute mechanisms, it may still be possible for States to
revamp the present BIT regime to better incorporate public interests, State
sovereignty, and human rights. For example, in 2005, the International Institute
for Sustainable Development (IISD) published a draft Model Investment
Agreement including such protections, which will be discussed in more detail in
Section VI.
Changing a treaty is complex and time consuming. Change can occur in one
of three ways. First, a completely new BIT could be negotiated and concluded.
Second, existing BITs could be amended. Third, the State-parties could issue
binding interpretations of certain BIT provisions. 128 Given that BITs are a treaty
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A. Integrate Domestic Human Rights Policy and Investment Policy
States should harmonize their approach to BITs with the rest of their domestic
policy. As discussed above, many States' laws and policies suffer from
"horizontal incoherence" where their investment-related departments may be
working separately from, and potentially in conflict with, their human rights-
related agencies and obligations. 129 A cohesive domestic legal system will help
prevent risk stabilization clauses from constraining a State's ability to regulate.
30
The goal is to strike a balance between the need for investor certainty and ensuring
that a State's legitimate interests are not compromised.'
3 1
Increasingly, States are exploring ways to integrate their domestic investment
policies and human rights-related policies. For example, many of South Africa's
BITs that were signed after 1994 will soon expire, providing an opportunity to
reassess the State's approach towards BITs.132 South Africa has announced that it
intends to closely scrutinize the "horizontal incoherence" between its BITs and
protections offered under South African law.1
33
B. Add Broader Policy Objectives to BIT Preambles
States should add broader policy objectives to the preambles, or the chapeau,
of their BITs. While provisions of a preamble are not binding, they are a valuable
tool for treaty interpretation and aid in deciphering the object and purpose a
treaty. 34 Many arbitration tribunals have sought to interpret BITs, particularly fair
and equitable treatment provisions, by looking to the treaty's preamble to decipher
its object and purpose. 35 This is the principle of effet utile, in "that interpretation
which accords practical content to a treaty provision will be favored over one that
deprives it of such effect."'136 However, a teleological method of interpretation that
would result in the implementation of a treaty's purpose in a manner not
contemplated by the parties must be rejected as contrary to the parties' intention.
137
Additionally, interpretations which exaggerate investor protections may dissuade
Host-States from admitting foreign investments and thereby undermine a BIT's
overarching purpose of "intensifying" the economic relationship between the
parties.
138
Most BIT preambles are one-dimensional, emphasizing the need to create a
favorable investment climate, without mentioning broader policy goals.' 39 Very
few BITs include in their preambles the need to respect State sovereignty and the
129. Ruggie -Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note 1, 33.
130. See SHEMBERG, supra note 90.
131. S. Afr. BIT Review, supra note 55, at 56.
132. Id. at 55.
133. Id.
134. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(2), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
135. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 8, at 113-14.
136. Id. at 114.
137. Id. at 115, 125.
138. Id. at 115-16, 126.
139. Id. at 116.
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laws of the State-parties. 140  However, a number of more recent BITs have
included in their preambles that investment promotion and protection must be
consistent with the recognition of internationally recognized labor rights,14" ' the
objective of not relaxing health, safety, and environmental measures, 142 and the
goal of sustainable development.
143
Norway's 2007 draft model BIT contains arguably the most extensive policy
objectives in its preamble. In addition to the provisions discussed above, the
preamble also references the following:
. sustainable utilization of economic resources . . the importance of
corporate social responsibility [the parties'] commitment to
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms in
accordance with their obligations under international law, including the
principles set out in the United Nations Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
144
However, in 2009, Norway abandoned its draft model BIT following polarized
public criticism. While some felt that the model did not provide enough investor
protections, others argued that the model would still restrain a government's ability
to regulate in the public interest.
45
While these preambles are not binding, they do affect the interpretation of
Host-State's obligations to investors. Including broader policy objectives, like
those in Norway's draft Model BIT, would counter-balance BITs' predominant
focus on investor's rights and force BIT arbitration tribunals to reconcile investor
protections with a Host-State's sovereignty and human rights-related obligations.
C. Acknowledge State Sovereignty
States should include in their BITs substantive language that acknowledges
State sovereignty. While provisions recognizing human rights are rare in preamble
provisions and non-existent in substantive treaty provisions, human rights-related
areas, such as environmental and labor laws, are increasingly discussed. For
example, Article 12 of the United States Model BIT provides for the following:
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by
weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic
environmental laws. Accordingly, each Party shall strive to ensure that it
140. Id. at 123.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 123-24.
143. Id. at 123.
144. Draft Version 191207, Agreement Between the Kingdom of Norway and - for the Protection
and Promotion of Investments pmbl. cls. 4, 6, 8 (Dec. 19, 2007), available at
http://www.asil.org/ilib080421 .cfm [hereinafter Norway Model BIT].
145. Damon Vis-Dunbar, Norway Shelves Its Draft Model Bilateral Investment Treaty,
INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, June 8, 2009, available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/2009/06/08/norway-
shelves-its-proposed-model-bilateral-investment-treaty/.
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does not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or
otherwise derogate from, such laws in a manner that weakens or reduces
the protections afforded in those laws as an encouragement for the
establishment, acquisition, expansion, or retention of an investment in
its territory.
146
Additionally, Article 13 contains nearly identical provisions regarding
"internationally recognized labor rights., 147 Language like these provisions should
be included in BITs to recalibrate the balance between investors' rights and State
sovereignty.
D. Provide Jurisdiction for Human Rights-Related Matters
States should provide investment tribunals with broader jurisdiction to include
human rights-related matters. BITs should include that an investment tribunal "is
competent to decide matters of public international law or human rights law that
might arise in the course of an arbitration.' 48 Specifically, a Host-State should be
able to raise as a defense that the Host-State's action was necessary to prevent the
investor from harming its citizenry or that the actions were necessary pursuant to
the Host-State's human rights obligations under international law. This concept
should include more specific guidance in BITs regarding the scope of the Police
Powers and a State's ability to regulate public health, the environment, and labor
rights, as discussed above.
149
Additionally, requiring that the Host-State prove that such actions were done
in good faith and with a non-discriminatory intent can mitigate the risk of abuse of
this defense. For example, the U.S. Model BIT provides that "[e]xcept in rare
circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed
and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health,
safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.' 5 °
E. Provide Human Rights Expertise in BIT Arbitration Tribunals
States should provide in BITs that when a human rights-related matter arises,
the arbitration tribunal must incorporate appropriate expertise into the decision-
making process. As discussed above, one problem in BIT arbitrations is that
arbitrators may lack the necessary expertise to deal with human rights-related
matters. To deal with this issue, many commentators have suggested two
solutions. First, BITs should require that arbitration tribunals dealing with human
rights-related claims include at least one arbitrator with knowledge of human rights
law. 5 1 Secondly, arbitrators should be allowed, encouraged, or perhaps even
146. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 33, art. 12.
147. Id. art. 13.
148. JACOB, supra note 73, at 45.
149. See supra Section III(F)(3).
150. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 33, Annex B 4(b).
151. Chalamish, supra note 13, at 352-53; Weiler, supra note 16, at 439.
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required to consult outside experts or specialized agencies regarding human rights-
related issues implicated in a case.'
52
F Require Transparency and Public Participation in BIT Arbitration
States should mandate open dispute resolution to bring greater transparency to
the BIT regime.' 53 Wider publication of BIT decisions will enable greater study of
the international investment law environment. "Only the availability of a
sufficiently large number of cases will lead to the emergence of a body of arbitral
case law."' 54 In turn, the development of a body of case law is necessary to bring
more certainty to the investment arbitration system. This would benefit MNCs and
States in that interpretations of common BIT provisions would gradually become
more consistent and the outcome of disputes would become more predictable.
Additionally, greater consistency in the arbitration process would also contribute to
the credibility of, and public trust in, arbitration as an appropriate and effective
dispute settlement mechanism.1
55
As discussed above, the United States now requires that investment rules
expressly provide for full transparency in BIT arbitrations. 156 Article 10 of the
U.S. Model BIT requires that decisions be "promptly published or otherwise made
publicly available."' 157  Similarly, ICSID offers the greatest level of
transparency. 158 All ICSID pending and concluded cases are available to the
public, including the subject matter of the arbitration, party names, date of
registration, composition of the tribunal, and the procedural timeline.
5 9
Additionally, States could add language to BITs allowing for amicus curiae
participation in the arbitration proceedings. Participation by observers, who do not
have a direct interest in the case, could be of great assistance to a tribunal by both
drawing attention to relevant matters not pleaded by the parties and by offering
expertise that may be outside the arbitrators' knowledge. 160  Currently, under
ICSID's rules, a tribunal may, after consulting the parties, allow persons or entities,
who do not have a significant interest in the proceeding, to file a written
submission on a matter within the scope of the dispute.
161
Notably, UNCTRAL is considering adopting greater transparency rules,
including publicly registering cases (possibly via an on-line docket), publishing
documents related to the arbitration, and providing rules for third-party amicus
152. Chalamish, supra note 13, at 352-53; PETERSON - MAPPING, supra note 70, at 45; PETERSON
& GRAY, supra note 78, at 35.
153. PETERSON - MAPPING, supra note 70, at 44.
154. Torterola, supra note 74, at 11.
155. Id. at8, 11.
156. PETERSON & GRAY, supra note 78, at 34.
157. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 33, art. 10.
158. PETERSON - MAPPING, supra note 70, at 41-42.
159. JACOB, supra note 73.
160. Id. at 37.
161. Torterola, supra note 74, at 11.
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curiae submissions. However, there is a major divergence regarding whether new
transparency rules should become the default UNCITRAL rules or whether they
should be offered merely as a secondary alternative option to the current default
rules. Indeed, a few States appear to prefer leaving the default rules in their
current form. One proposed compromise would be to create an annex to the
generic UNCITRAL rules that would apply to all investor-State arbitration, unless
the parties to the BIT explicitly opt-out of the annex. This would ensure the
"maximum application of the transparency rules" while preserving the opt-out
option for States.
162
VI. How TO PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS BY MAKING ONE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE
IN THE BIT REGIME
Some argue that the above changes are not enough and that BITs, which
provide investor-MNCs with highly enforceable rights, should also require of
investors reciprocal obligations. However, such a concept is highly controversial
as it would be a "radical departure" from the traditional purpose of a BIT - the
protection of foreign investors - to having the dual purpose of human rights
enforcement. 163 Additionally, those opposed to adding investor obligations to
BITs argue that "such drastic gestures would run the serious risk of driving
businesses out of the public system of international law and into the even less
transparent, accountable, and legitimate realms of private regulation and non-legal
dispute resolution."
'1 64
Commentators have generally suggested three very different possible
constructions of investor obligations in BITs. One, an investor's failure to comply
with investor obligations in the BIT would have "mitigating or off-setting effects...
on the merits of a claim or on any damages award in the event of such award.,
165
Two, investor obligations could act as a limit on investor rights. For example, a
MNC would not be able to claim protection under the BIT unless they had
complied with the investor obligations required by the BIT.166 Three, investor
obligations could expand the rights of the Host-State against an investor. For
example, a Host-State would be enabled to bring a claim or counterclaim against
an investor where the investor did not meet its obligations under the BIT.
167
Below, Sub-Section A lays out a theoretical foundation for holding investor-
MNCs responsible for human rights abuses. Sub-Sections B through K discuss
162. Transparency in UNC1TRAL Arbitration Rules Discussed in Vienna, News in Brief,
INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Dec. 16, 2010, at 14-15, available at http://www.iisd.org/
itn/2010/12/16/news-in-brief-2/.
163. JACOB, supra note 73, at 38.
164. Id. at 37.
165. HOWARD MANN ET AL., INT'L INST. OF SUSTAINABLE DEV., MODEL INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT art. 18(B), (D) (2005), available at
http://www.fes-globalization.org/dog_publications/Appendix/ 202 / 20IISD / 20Model.pdf [hereinafter
IISD Model].
166. Fauchald & Stigen, supra note 2, at 1051-52.
167. Id.; IISD Model, supra note 165, art. 18(E).
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several of the investor obligations that various commentators and scholars have
proposed. These descriptions do not represent an exhaustive list of proposed
investor obligations. Moreover, they are not meant to be considered in isolation;
rather several of these obligations could be incorporated into a single BIT.
A. Theoretical Foundation. MNCs & Human Rights Obligations
Widespread trade and investment liberalization has allowed dominant
corporations to enjoy increasing levels of economic and political clout.
168
However, the theory behind creating obligations for MNCs does not rest on the
benefits or harm MNCs have brought to the global community but rather their
collective global power as non-State actors. Many MNCs' revenues surpass the
entire gross domestic products of nation-States.' 69 In 2000, 51 of the world's top
100 largest economies were corporations, not nation-States, and 6 percent of the
top 200 corporations' annual combined sales exceeded the total combined annual
income of 1.2 billion of the world's population living in severe poverty. 70 Indeed,
relations between States no longer dominate the international environment.
Rather, autonomous, non-State actors, supranational corporations wield an
extraordinary amount of financial and political power, acting "in near-total
impunity."'7 1  Such power should be matched with a corresponding degree of
responsibility and accountability.
Some argue that discussing international legal duties for MNCs redefines
international human rights in an "unacceptable way," in that it is a departure from
international law's traditional sphere of supplying duties only to governmental
action. 172 Three factors must be considered in response to this concern.
First, a right may exist "without knowing who is bound by duties based on it
or what precisely these duties are."' 173 Thus, a right may exist with a wide range of
corresponding duty-holders. Human rights are an entitlement to all mankind. In
theory, the number of corresponding duty-holders is unlimited. However,
historically, duties have been assigned primarily to nation-States.
Secondly, international law has recognized human rights duties on non-State
actors, although this is limited to relatively few human rights abuses.174 Under
international humanitarian law, rebel groups have a duty to respect the
168. SARAH ANDERSON & JOHN CAVANAGH, TOP 200: THE RISE OF CORPORATE GLOBAL POWER
1 (2000), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/corpwatch.org/downloads/top200.pdf
169. Id. at 3.
170. Id.
171. Anne-Christine Habbard, The Integration of Human Rights in Corporate Principles, in
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 99, 99 (2001).
172. Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111
YALE L.J. 443, 466 (2001).
173. Id. at 468 (citing JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 184 (1986)).
174. Id. at 466-67.
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fundamental rights of persons under their control. 7 5 States have also accepted that
non-State actors have duties within international criminal law on human rights
atrocities.' 76  Lastly, war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, torture,
slavery, forced labor, apartheid, and forced disappearances are all crimes under
international law, even when perpetrated by non-State actors. 177 However, while
these obligations on non-State actors have been extended to individuals, they have
not been extended to legal entities. For example, the Nuremberg Tribunal after
WWII focused on individual criminal responsibility, not corporate criminal
responsibility. Similarly, the statutes for the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the
International Criminal Court do not authorize the prosecution of legal entities, only
natural persons. 1
78
Third, the origins of our present State-centered human rights system provides
persuasive evidence that human rights duties should be extended to MNCs.
Throughout history, nation-States have represented the greatest danger to the
individual and human dignity. After WWII, the human rights developed and
embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provided duties for
States.179 Given that MNCs have integrated into the daily fabric of our societies,
have economic power comparable to some States, and have shown that they can
pose a great danger to human dignity, it is not a leap in logic to suggest that these
same human rights necessitate that MNCs should have some duties as well. Thus,
new rights would not be created, but rather the duties States have to protect human
rights would be extended onto MNCs.
Additionally, some argue that international corporate responsibility will only
enable "company directors . . to reallocate liability onto corporations by
dispersing any penalty amongst the shareholders of the company." Additionally,
"this not only diminishes the deterrent effect of the punishment," but it "ultimately
may shift the punishment onto individuals [like shareholders] who may be entirely
innocent."' 80 However, corporate liability and individual liability are not mutually
exclusive.18' Moreover, like the breach of a fiduciary duty, or any poor corporate
decision-making, shareholders would likely experience consequences if a
corporation was found legally responsible for a human rights violation;
plummeting stock values and tarnishing the corporate name are pivotal
components to deterring illegal corporate behavior.
Lastly, while investor obligations may be a new, emerging concept, they are
not "radical." Investment treaty awards have already incorporated the concept of




178. Fauchald & Stigen, supra note 2, at 1037-40.
179. Ratner, supra note 172, at 469.
180. Fauchald & Stigen, supra note 2, at 1043-44.
181. Id. at 1044.
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treaties that the investment be made "in accordance with local laws" as an investor
obligation. Tribunals have also recognized a requirement of "good faith" by
investors "to avoid hearing claims that are based on unlawful conduct... such as,
bribing government officials or misrepresentation to authorities at a tender
stage."'182  Moreover, there seems to be growing momentum towards serious
consideration of investor obligations. Tomas Baert, the European Commission
Directorate General for Trade, Services and Investment, has commented that the
discourse and debate surrounding the formation of an EU investment policy has
included the possibility of adding investor obligations in areas of human rights and
corporate social responsibility in EU investment treaties.' 
83
B. Umbrella Clauses: Discard Them or Make Them Reciprocal
One option for an investor obligation would be to structure "umbrella
clauses" in BITs to be reciprocal. Umbrella clauses are common provisions that
require a Host-State to, for example, "observe any obligation it may have entered"
or "constantly guarantee the observance of the commitments it has entered into.,
184
The exact wording for umbrella clauses varies 85 and the meaning of individual
umbrella clauses has been very controversial.1 86 For example, a MiNC could bring
a claim against a State under the umbrella clause where the State violated the terms
of a contract, like a Host-State Agreement, between the State and the MNC.
However, violations of umbrella clauses are not limited to contractual violations,
and can also include legislation, regulation, and administrative acts, 187 and
"collateral guarantees, warranties or letters of comfort" provided by a Host-State to
induce foreign investment. 188 The effect of umbrella clauses is that violations of
promises, contractual or not, given to an investor are elevated to be a violation of a
BIT.
Umbrella clauses first appeared in the 1950s and originated in the trepidation
of the asymmetrical balance of power between investors and States. 89 Given that
182. Mahnaz Malik, The IISD Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable
Development, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 561, 581 (Marie-Claire
Cordonier Segger et a]. eds., 2011).
183. Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy: An Interview With
Tomas Baert, European Commission, Directorate General for Trade, Services and Investment,
INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Sept. 23, 2010, at 4, available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/
2010/09/23/towards-a-comprehensive-european-internationa-investment-policy-an-interview-with-
tomas-baert-european-commission-directorate-genera-for-trade-services-and-investment/.
184. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 8, at 437; Katia Yannaca-Small, Interpretation of the
Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements, in ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: UNDERSTANDING CONCEPTS AND TRACKING INNOVATIONS 101,
102 (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/6/40471535.pdf [hereinafter OECD -
Umbrella Clauses].
185. Id.
186. Id. at 101.
187. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 8, at 457.
188. Id.
189. OECD - Umbrella Clauses, supra note 184, at 124; JACOB, supra note 73, at 20.
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this power imbalance is less prominent in the present international environment
and that some MNCs may arguably be as powerful, or even more powerful, than
certain States, some argue that umbrella clauses are no longer necessary to insulate
and protect investors. 90 Notably, the United States Model BIT no longer contains
an umbrella clause.
1 91
Alternatively, instead of abandoning umbrella clauses, they could be made to
be reciprocal. While conceivably either an investor or a Host-State could breach
an obligation or commitment, umbrella clauses are generally formulated as
obligations solely on the Host-State. An umbrella clause could be recast to place
strong reciprocal obligations on an investor to observe their commitments and
obligations to the Host-State.' 92 These reciprocal umbrella clauses could be re-
framed to either allow the Host-State to invoke the clause as a defense or
mitigating factor when an investor institutes a claim under a BIT, or as a basis for a
Host-State to initiate a BIT arbitration against the investor.
C. Improve the Transparency of BITs and Host-State Agreements
States should consider stipulating in their BITs, or subsequent Host-State
agreements with investors, that investment contracts and project information must
be published. For example, Article 11 of the IISD Model requires that investors
provide any information that a potential Host-State Party "may require concerning
the investment in question for purposes of decision-making in relation to that
investment or solely for statistical purposes," except "confidential business
information ... that would prejudice the competitive position of the investor or the
investment.' 1 93 Additionally, Article 15 requires that:
[i]n accordance with the size and nature of an investment ... Investors
and investments shall make available to the public any investment
contract or agreement with the [H]ost-[S]tate government involved in
the investment authorization process, subject to the redaction of
confidential business information. Investors or investments shall publish
all information relating to payments made to [H]ost-[S]tate public
authorities, including taxes, royalties, surcharges, fees and all other
payments.'
94
Publication of project information, as described by these provisions, would
serve three functions. First, it would inform impacted non-State actors of the
investing MNC's plans and of the obligations that the government and the MNC
have undertaken. Impacted non-State actors would then have notice of the
impending investment and if needed, and were possible, take appropriate steps to
object to actions or obligations undertaken by the investing MNC or their own
government. Second, this notice would provide Host-States with an important
190. JACOB, supra note 73, at 20.
191. Id.
192. Fauchald & Stigen, supra note 2, at 1054.
193. IISD Model, supra note 165, art. 11(D).
194. Id. art. 15(B).
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assurance of legitimacy of process. Third, because foreign investors negotiating
Host-State agreements would have notice that their agreement would be published,
and thus open to public scrutiny, foreign investors may act with a greater sense of
fairness in negotiating Host-State agreements.
195
D. "Due Diligence " Standard
Another option for investor obligations would be in line with the framework
put forth by John Ruggie, the United Nations Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on the issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations
and other Business Enterprises. Ruggie's "Protect, Respect, and Remedy" policy
framework, adopted unanimously by the Human Rights Council in June 2008, rests
on three pillars. First, "the State [has a] duty to protect against human rights
abuses by third parties, including business, through appropriate policies,
regulation, and adjudication."' 96 Second, there must be "corporate responsibility to
respect human rights, which means to act with due diligence to avoid infringing on
the rights of others."'9 7 Third, States and MNCs should ensure that victims have
"greater access.. to effective remedy, judicial and non-judicial." '19 8
Thus, drawing from Ruggie's second pillar, one option would be "a due
diligence standard for all obligations that have not attained the status ofjus cogens
normns."' 19 9  Ruggie defines due diligence as requiring the following four
components. First, companies should adopt a human rights policy, 200 and
secondly, companies should integrate this policy throughout the company.2 1
Third, companies should conduct a human rights impact assessment, including
meaningful engagement and dialogue with impacted non-State actors, to better
understand the effects of their existing and proposed activities. 202  "When
conducting such assessments, companies can find an authoritative list of rights at a
minimum in the International Bill of Human Rights" (including the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR), the International
Labor Organization's (ILO) core conventions, 20 3 international humanitarian law in
conflict-affected areas, and standards specific to vulnerable groups, such as,
204indigenous peoples or children. Fourth, companies should adopt monitoring and
auditing procedures to track the company's human rights impact and
195. SHEMBERG, supra note 90, at 43.
196. Ruggie - Further Steps, supra note 12, 1.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Weiler, supra note 16, at 445; Ruggie - Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note 1, 25.
200. Ruggie - Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note 1, 60.
201. Id. 62.
202. Id. 61; Ruggie - Further Steps, supra note 12, 84.
203. Ruggie - Further Steps, supra note 12, 60; Ruggie - Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra
note 1, 58.
204. Ruggie -Further Steps, supra note 12, 61.
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performance.2 °  Due diligence, unlike commercial, technical, and political risk
management, is not a one-time action but must be "ongoing and dynamic. 20 6
This approach of a non-specific due diligence standard is advantageous for
several reasons. First, this standard would not be new, but an extension of well-
established practices. MNCs already routinely conduct due diligence to ensure that
a contemplated transaction has no hidden risks and to manage risks to the company
and stakeholders, for example, to prevent employment discrimination,
environmental damage, or criminal misconduct.20 7 Second, this standard is flexible
to meet the needs of different industries, different size MNCs, and different
country conditions, in that it allows MNCs to develop their own solutions and
measures to comply with this standard. 20 8 The scope of due diligence depends on
three factors: the country context in which a company is operating, the human
rights impacts its activities may have, and whether the company may be
contributing to abuses through relationships connected to its activities (e.g.
subcontractors) .209 Thus, the due diligence standard "would permit investors to be
held accountable for serious abuses but would not unduly impair their ability to
efficiently establish and maintain their investment activity in the territory of the
[H]ost-[S]tates. 2 1° Third, this approach would provide corporate boards with
strong protection in mismanagement claims by shareholders, and in lawsuits under
the Alien Tort Statute and similar lawsuits, as it would be proof that the
corporation took reasonable steps to avoid involvement in the alleged wrong.
2t1
Lastly, Ruggie describes this approach as "a game-changer" from "naming
and shaming," the response by external stakeholders to a MNC's failure to respect
human rights, to "knowing and showing," a MNC's internalization of human rights
due diligence.212
E. Anti-Corruption Provisions
The IISD Model suggests an anti-corruption obligation, 213 derived from the
2003 United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the OECD Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business, which
entered into force in 1999.214 Investors and their investments can not, either prior
205. Ruggie - Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note 1, 1 63.
206. Ruggie - Further Steps, supra note 12, 84-85.
207. Id. 181.
208. Id. 82.
209. Ruggie - Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note 1, at 25, 57.
210. Weiler, supra note 16, at 445-46.
211. Ruggie - Further Steps, supra note 12, 86.
212. Id. t! 80.
213. IISD Model, supra note 165, art. 13.
214. HOWARD MANN ET AL., INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., IISD MODEL INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: NEGOTIATORS' HANDBOOK 24-25
(2d ed. 2005), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment modelint-handbook.pdf
[hereinafter IISD MODEL - HANDBOOK].
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to or after the establishment of an investment, commit, be complicit in, incite, aid
and abet, authorize, or conspire to commit any of the following acts:
[an] offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage,
whether directly or through intermediaries, to a public official of the
[H]ost-[S]tate, for that official or for a third party, in order that the
official or third party act or refrain from acting in relation to the
performance of official duties, in order to achieve any favour in relation
to a proposed investment or any licences, permits, contracts or other
rights in relation to an investment.
215
The terminology is meant to make corruption practices an unacceptable business
practice.2 16 Where an investor or its investment breaches this provision, the
investor would lose the right to initiate any dispute settlement process established
under the BIT.217
F Require Pre-Establishment Environmental and Social Impact Assessments
A BIT should include an investor obligation for environmental and social
impact assessments. An environmental impact assessment would evaluate the
investments anticipated impact on the local community's land, natural resources,
air quality, water resources, and the like. Similarly, a social impact assessment
would evaluate the investment's anticipated impact on the local community's
society, which could include impacts on human rights, the decision-making and
governing structure, religious beliefs, family values, and many other topics. In his
April 2010 report, Ruggie stated that a key policy tool for States striving to uphold
the "Protect" pillar is"[e]ncouraging or requiring companies to report on human
rights policies and impacts., 218  Notably, it "enables shareholders and other
stakeholders to better engage with businesses, assess risk and compare
performance within and across industries" and reinforces and compliments the due
diligence standard's component regarding human rights assessments.
219
1. The Scope of Environmental and Social Impact Assessments
General descriptions of environmental and social impact assessments are
necessarily ambiguous, as such assessments apply to a wide variety of investments.
For example, OPIC's environmental and social assessment policy includes the
following key process elements:
(1)project definition;
(2)(initial) screening of the project and the scoping of the Assessment process;
215. IISD Model, supra note 165, art. 13.
216. IISD MODEL -HANDBOOK, supra note 214, at 24-25.
217. IISD Model, supra note 165, art. 18(A).
218. Ruggie -Further Steps, supra note 12, 36.
219. Id.
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(3)stakeholder identification and gathering of social and environmental baseline data,
where relevant;
(4)impact identification and analysis; and
(5) generation of mitigation or management measures and actions.
Additionally, OPIC requires that the "breadth, depth and type of analysis . . be
proportionate to the nature and scale of the proposed project's potential impacts,"
220and that the assessment conform to any related Host-State requirements.
Similarly, Article 13 of IISD's Model requires both environmental and social
impact assessments. The Model requires a social impact assessment for all
investments, according to "standards" that would have to be established by the
State-parties. 221 However, environmental assessments would only be required for
"applicable" proposed investments. The Model requires that the State-parties
establish "screening criteria" and a process for the environmental assessments.
The scope of the required assessment would vary depending on issues related to
the enterprise's size and its inputs and output. 222 For example, small enterprises
and many service-related enterprises should be exempt from the assessment
requirements, while resource-related projects should be required to comply with
the assessment process.223 Thus, this assessment requirement could be introduced
gradually, applying only to the most high-risk investments.
Determining what investments should be required to perform an
environmental or social assessment would not be a new question, as it has been
discussed and determined in other areas outside of BITs. For example, consider
the approach of OPIC. OPIC refuses to provide political risk insurance for
investments in the following specific categorically prohibited sectors:
* Conversion or degradation of Critical Natural Habitats (areas protected by
traditional local communities and sites critical to biodiversity and vulnerable
animal species).
* Large dams that disrupt ecosystems, displace more than 5,000 people, or
impact local inhabitants' ability to earn a livelihood.
* Commercial manufacturing of ozone-depleting substances or persistent
organic pollutants that are banned or scheduled to be phased out during the
life the project.
* Projects that require the resettlement of 5,000 or more persons
* Projects in or impacting natural World Heritage Sites.
2 24
220. INT'L FN. CORP., GUIDANCE NOTE 1: SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS G1O (July 31, 2007) available at http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/
AttachmentsByTitle/pol_GuidanceNote2007_l/$ FILE/2007+Updated-Guidance+Note_l .pdf
221. IISD Model, supra note 165, art. 12.
222. Id.
223. Id. n. 10
224. OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORP., Investor Screener, http://www.opic.gov/doing-
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Given that these investments have already been identified as representing a
particularly high-risk, these would be the type of investments that BITs should
require to complete an environmental and social impact assessment prior to
establishing the investment. Thus, States can look to public and private political
risk insurers for guidance regarding what investments are particularly risky in each
Host-State.
Additionally, the IISD Model states that investors and the Host-State should
apply the "precautionary principle" to the environmental impact assessment and
22decisions taken in relation to a proposed investment. 25 The precautionary
principle, as defined in Article 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, requires that "[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. 226
2. Publish Environmental and Social Impact Assessments
The requirements for environmental and social impact assessments should
also include that the assessments be published. For example, the IISD Model
requires that all environmental and social impact assessments must be made public
and accessible to the local community and affected interests in the Host-State
before the Host-State makes any final decisions regarding whether to allow the
investment.227 This minimum obligation ensures that communities will be
adequately informed about potential activities in the local area and that
communities will generally have a chance to respond if needed.
Similarly, BITs could require that the assessments also be subject to a public
comment period. For example, OPIC not only requires an impact assessment for
environmentally or socially sensitive projects,228 but also that the assessments be
published and subjected to a public comment period. Assessments are posted for
at least 60 days and OPIC invites public comment, which OPIC subsequently
considers in making its final decision.229
G. Require Certification of a Management Standard
The IISD Model, in Article 14(A), also requires that all investments must
"maintain an environmental management system." Specifically, companies with
over a certain number of employees (e.g. 250 or 500) or high-risk industrial
enterprises (e.g. resources exploitation), must maintain a current certification to the
International Organization for Standardization's (ISO) "ISO 14001" standard, or
an equivalent environmental management standard, including an emergency
business/investor-screener (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) [OPIC - Investor Screener].
225. IISD Model, supra note 165, art. 12(D), n.11.
226. Id.
227. Id. art. 12(C).
228. OPIC-Spinelli, supra note 44.
229. Id.
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response and decommissioning plan.230 However, in countries or regions where
certification may not be possible, the IISD Model requires that companies must
make a good faith effort to obtain and maintain certification.23 1
The ISO is the world's largest developer and publisher of international
standards. It is comprised of a network of 160 countries' national standards
institutes with a Central Secretariat in Geneva, Switzerland that coordinates the
system. The ISO bridges the gap between the public and private sectors to reach
solutions that meet both the requirements of business and the broader needs of
society.232 The ISO 14001 is a standard that is intended to provide a framework
for a holistic, strategic approach to the organization's environmental policy, plans
and actions.233  The ISO 14001 gives the generic requirements for an
environmental management system:
* identify and control the environmental impact of activities, products or
services;
* improve environmental performance continually; and
* implement a systematic approach to setting environmental objectives and
targets, to achieving these and to demonstrating that they have been
achieved.
234
Fulfilling these requirements demands objective evidence which can be audited to
demonstrate that the environmental management system is operating effectively in
conformity to the standard.23 5
H. Require Investors to Uphold International Human Rights Norms
Article 14 of the IISD Model provides a very general requirement that
investors and investments should "uphold human rights in the workplace and in the
[S]tate and community in which they are located" and not undertake, cause to be
undertaken, be complicit with, or assist in, the violation of the human rights,
including during civil strife.236 This provision does not encompass proactive
requirements; for example, it does not require corporations to build schools to
achieve a child's right to education. IISD derived this provision from the OECD
and UN instruments on bribery and corruption and the introductory words of
Principles 1 and 2 of the Global Compact.237 As discussed above, this would not
create a new human right, but merely extend the duty to uphold human rights to
include, not only States, but also MNCs.
230. IISD Model, supra note 165, art. 14(A).
231. Id. n.12.
232. INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, About ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/about.htm (last visited
Mar. 1,2011).
233. INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO 14000 Essentials, http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_14000
essentials (last visited Mar. 1,2011).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. IISD Model, supra note 165, art. 14(B).
237. IISD MODEL- HANDBOOK, supra note 214, at 25-26.
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I. Require Investors Should Uphold the Core ILO Standards
Many commentators have discussed the possibility of including the ILO's
core conventions as investor obligations in BITs. The IISD Model, in Article
14(C), provides that investors and investments must act in accordance with core
labor standards as required by the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights of Work.2 38 IISD notes that this "should be non-controversial, given the
acceptance of this instrument by almost all countries of the world in the tri-partite
ILO structure (labour, business, governments)., 239 Notably, some public political
risk insurers, like OPIC, require that investors uphold the ILOs labor standards as a
precondition to receiving political risk insurance for their foreign investments.24 °
J. Require a Standard of Corporate Social Responsibility
Another option would be to annex or adopt into the BIT human rights norms
from existing corporate codes of conduct.24' Since the early 1990s, MNCs have
encountered criticism of their corporate practices in developing countries, which
has pushed many to adopt corporate codes of conduct.242 Corporate responsibility
guidelines generally fall within two categories, those that are State-controlled and
those that are industry-controlled. Examples of State-controlled codes include the
United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Enterprises and
Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights, the United Nations
Global Compact, and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
2 43
Examples of industry-controlled codes include the Social Accountability 8000
Standard (SA 8000), the Global Sullivan Principles, and the Kimberly Process.244
However, all corporate codes of conduct share one characteristic; they are all
voluntary with very limited enforcement mechanisms. Any code of conduct will
not be successful if it lacks a credible threat of enforcement, including monitoring
and reporting activities. 245 Additionally, many see corporate codes of conduct as
public relations tools, rather than substantive and legitimate tools for the
enforcement of human rights norms. For example, in 2007 the Global Compact
Office reported that 63 percent of 400 companies surveyed indicated that one of
the reasons they joined the Global Compact was to increase trust in their
246company.
238. IISD Model, supra note 165, art. 14(C).
239. IISD MODEL -HANDBOOK, supra note 214, at 26.
240. OPIC - Investor Screener, supra note 224.
241. Chalamish, supra note 13, at 350; Weiler, supra note 16, at 445-47.
242. Chalamish, supra note 13, at 349.
243. Weiler, supra note 16, at 434.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 435-37.
246. U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT OFFICE, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT ANNUAL REVIEW 2007 LEADERS
SUMMIT 11 (2007), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/newsevents/8.1/GC
AnnualReview2007.pdf.
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1. The SA 8000 Standard
Some commentators have highlighted the SA 8000 as a suggested standard
for States to consider adopting into their BITs.247 The SA 8000 was established by
Social Accountability International and is grounded on the principles of core
conventions of the ILO, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.248 It is one of the world's
preeminent social standards and is a recognized benchmark among the voluntary
codes and standards initiatives by which companies and factories measure their
performance. 249 The content of the standard includes nine requirements:
(1) prohibition of child labor;
(2) prohibition of forced and compulsory labor;
(3) basic health and safety requirements;
(4) guarantees for the freedom of association and the right to collective
bargaining;
(5) prohibition on discrimination;
(6) disciplinary practices cannot include corporal punishment or other
inhumane treatment;
(7) working hours are limited to 48 hours per week, not including overtime;
(8) requirements for reasonable remuneration; and
(9) requirements for management systems.
250
Additionally, the SA8000 certifies conformance by auditing a corporation's
facilities and practices. 251 Notably, a SA8000 certification would appear to meet
Ruggie's "due diligence" standard and impose similar requirements to the IISD
Model discussed above.
2. Non-Binding Aspirations for Corporate Social Responsibility
Alternatively, the IISD's Model remains in line with current non-binding,
aspirational tone of corporate social responsibility, by using language just short of
mandating compliance. Article 16 provides that "[i]nvestors and their investments
should strive to make the maximum feasible contributions to the sustainable
development of the [H]ost-[S]tate and local community through high levels of' .52
socially responsible practices." In contributing to the sustainable development
of the Host-State, the investor should take into account the following:
247. Chalamish, supra note 13, at 352 n.323; Weiler, supra note 16, at 445-47.
248. SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY INTERNATIONAL, Human Rights at Work, http://www.sa-intl.org
(last visited Mar. 1, 2011) [hereinafter SAI - Human Rights at Work].
249. Id.
250. SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY INTERNATIONAL, The SA8000 Standard, http://www.sa-
intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPage&PagelD=937 (last visited Mar. 1,2011).
251. SAI - Human Rights at Work, supra note 248.
252. IISD Model, supra note 165, art. 16.
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(1) the Host-State's development plans and priorities;
(2) the Millennium Development Goals;
(3) the ILO Tripartite Declaration on Multinational Enterprises and Social
Policy;
(4) the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises;
(5) sectoral standards of responsible practice where these exist; and
(6) the preliminary list of corporate social responsibility issues included in
Annex F to the Model BIT.
253
This type of corporate social responsibility provision would be included into a BIT
as a supplement to other investor obligations delineated elsewhere in the BIT.254
K. Provide Possibilities for New Awards More Appropriate for MNCs
Recognizing that direct investor obligations would be a new addition to BITs,
the content of BIT arbitration awards and applicable remedies should also be
addressed. As with any BIT claim, the remedy of compensation should also be
expressly permitted in arbitration disputes regarding human rights. 255 However,
given that the financial cost of potential claims is already a factor in most
corporations' cost-benefit analysis, financial compensation may not be an effective
deterrent for human rights abuses. The compensation awards given against
corporations for human rights-related violations would have to outweigh the
benefits the corporation obtained from the violation. Alternative punishments
could include management intervention, community-service orders, and adverse
publicity. "Of these alternatives, adverse publicity may well be the most effective
deterrent as it affects both the corporation's prestige and financial success. ,
256
VII. CONCLUSION
Currently, international investment law consists of a patchwork of BITs.
Gaps in the BIT regime have greatly affected Host-States' abilities to protect
human rights. Additionally, while BITs grant MNCs valuable rights, they do not
provide any reciprocal obligations. Despite these problems, the widespread
establishment of BITs and their highly efficient use of arbitration tribunals to
resolves disputes, makes BITs an unlikely but promising mechanism for human
rights enforcement.
States should reform BITs to remove, or at least limit, encumbrances on a
State's regulatory power to protect human rights. States should review their BITs,
and where there is horizontal incoherence, harmonize their human rights policies
across government departments and agencies. Additionally, States should add to
253. Id.
254. IISD MODEL -HANDBOOK, supra note 214, at 27.
255. Weiler, supra note 16, at 439 (noting that the "remedy of compensation for the breach of a
human rights obligation has a long history in international treaty practice").
256. Fauchald & Stigen, supra note 2, at 1042.
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their BITs broader policy objectives in preamble provisions, substantive language
that acknowledges State sovereignty, broader jurisdiction regarding human rights-
related matters, and requirements for expertise regarding human rights-related
matters in arbitral tribunals. Lastly, States should mandate open dispute resolution
to bring greater transparency to the BIT regime and wider publication of BIT
decisions to enable greater study of the international investment law environment.
Moreover, BITs could be restructured, not to remove the rights and benefits
BITs grant to MNCs, but to create reciprocal obligations for MNCs to act
responsibly and not violate human rights. First, States could structure umbrella
clauses in BITs to be reciprocal. Second, States could stipulate in their BITs, or
subsequent Host-State Agreements with investors, that investment contracts and
project information must be published. Third, States could require that investors
comply with a "due diligence" standard, a general requirement to uphold human
rights, the ILO's core conventions, existing corporate codes of conduct, and/or
anti-corruption obligations. Lastly, States could require that investors complete
and publish environmental and social impact assessments.
Given the growing body of scholarly discussion on this topic, and that States
are willing and interested in revamping their approaches to BITs, political will
seems to be growing in acknowledging that something must be done.
Unfortunately, because investment law exists primarily through bilateral
agreements, solutions to incorporate human rights must occur on a national level,
and thus change undoubtedly will be diverse and slow.
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